Theory of Policy Design

Economics has a great deal to say about how to design policies that minimize the costs of achieving public objectives, as well as what those objectives ought to be. My contributions include a look at how a nonlinear tax system can achieve the right outcome when the regulator lacks information on private costs, what the optimal entry/exit condition is for a polluting industry, and how to improve the efficiency of ratio or intensity standards. Contact me if you want a reprint of any of these.

• ** McKitrick, Ross (2005). "Decentralizing a Regulatory Standard Expressed in Ratio or Intensity Form." Energy Journal 26(4) 1-9.
• **McKitrick, Ross R. and Robert C. Collinge. (2002) "The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44, pp 106-122.
• **McKitrick, Ross R. (2001) "The Design of Regulations Expressed as Ratios or Percentage Quotas." Journal of Regulatory Economics 19(3), pp. 295-305.
• **McKitrick, Ross R. and Robert C. Collinge, (2000) "Linear Pigovian Taxes and the Optimal Size of a Polluting Industry" Canadian Journal of Economics 33(4) pp. 1106-1119.
• **McKitrick, Ross R. (1999) "A Derivation of the Marginal Abatement Cost Function." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management May 1999, pp. 306-314.
• **McKitrick, Ross R. (1999) "A Cournot Mechanism for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information." Environmental and Resource Economics October 1999, pp. 353-363.
• **McKitrick, Ross and Timothy Shufelt (2002) "Environmental Impacts of Enhanced Property Rights." Environment and Energy 13(3) pp. 367-382.